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1. Is the state interest in regulating artificial, computer-generated child pornography 
sufficiently compelling to justify abrogation of free speech?
2. Is the CPPA unconstitutionally vague because neither a person of reasonable 
intelligence, nor a law enforcement officer have notice of what the phrases 
“appears to be’’ and “conveys the impression’’ of being a minor mean?
3. Is the CPPA overbroad because the “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” 
provisions reach constitutionally protected materials that include youthful-looking 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
John Ashcroft, Attorney General 
of the United States, et al..
Petitioners,
V.
The Free Speech Coalition, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Respondents The Free Speech Coalition, et. al., respectfully submit this brief, and request 
that this Court AFFIRM the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
that the Child Pornography Protection Act (CPPA) is an unconstitutional infringement of free 
speech, and permanently enjoin Petitioners from enforcing the CCPA.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court reviews de novo challenges to federal statutes restricting First Amendment 
rights. Peel v. Atty. Registration & Disciplin. Commn. of Hi, 496 U.S. 91,108 (1990). The 
court reviews de novo challenges to Congressional findings. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 2001 U.S.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
This case appeals from the Ninth Circuit decision holding unconstitutional the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act. The Free Speech Coalition, Bold Type Inc., Jim Gingerich and 
Ron Rafaelli (“Respondents”) filed a pre-enforcement challenge to the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act (CPPA) with the United States District Court for the Northern District on January 
27, 1997. (J.A. 1.) Respondents argued that the CPPA, by criminalizing computer images of 
sexually explicit materials that do not depict actual minors, violated the First Amendment. (J.A. 
2.) Respondents and Petitioners, (Janet Reno and the Department of Justice) moved for 
summary judgment. (J.A. 9,14.) On August 12, 1999, the District Court granted Petitioners’ 
motion and denied Respondents* request for declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that 
the CPPA did not improperly restrain speech, and was therefore constitutional. (J.A. 85.)
Respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on 
August 13, 1997. (J.A. 87.) The Ninth Circuit held that the phrases "appears to be" a minor and 
"conveys the impression" of a minor were vague and overbroad, and thus, violated the First 
Amendment. The Free Speech Coalition v. Janet RenOy 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (1999). The Court 
held, however, that without these phrases, the CPPA would be constitutional. Id. at 1086. The 
Court affirmed in part (on issues of standing and prior restraint), reversed in part (on the issue of 
constitutionality of the statutory language), and remanded the case to the District Court. Id. at 
1097. Petitioners moved for rehearing and for rehearing en banc. (J.A. 107.) The Ninth Circuit 
denied both motions on July 24, 2000. Id. at 1086. Petitioner then appealed to the United States
LEXIS 3815 (2001). The court is the final authority on issues of statutory construction. INS v.
Cardozo Fonseca^ 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on January 22, 2001. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition,
121 S.Ct. 876.
S^tatement of Facts
1. Evolution of Child Pornography Prevention Act
This Court, in this appeal, reviews the constitutionality of the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act (CPPA). Specifically, this Court considers whether the phrases “appears to 
be” and “conveys the impression” restrict free speech. This Court expressly held that the 
First Amendment protects speech containing sexually explicit images that do not involve real
children. N. Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982).
Congress first passed laws to protect children from sexual exploitation with the 
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-225,92 Stat.
7 (1977) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252, 2253). In this Act, Congress 
prohibited the use of actual minors engaged in sexually explicit behavior to create visual 
images with the knowledge or intent to transport those images in interstate or foreign 
commerce. The statute outlawed photographs, pictures, and undeveloped film depicting
minors engaged in sexually explicit behavior.
In 1982, this Court reviewed the constitutionality of a New York Statute that contained 
provisions similar to those in the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act and 
held that pornography involving sexual exploitation of actual children did not deserve First 
Amendment protection. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749. This Court held that the compelling state 
interest to protect actual children from sexual abuse justified restriction of any speech that relied 
on the sexual exploitation of children. Id. The Court restricted this holding to pornography 
depicting actual children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Id.
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In reaction to Ferber, Congress enacted the Child Protection Act of 1984, which 
expanded the scope of federal child pornography laws. This Act 1) raised the age of minority 
from 16 to 18; 2) eliminated the requirement that the child pornography be obscene by adult 
standards; and 3) eliminated the requirement that distributors profit from sale of depictions of 
sexually explicit conduct by minors. Pub. L. No. 98-292. 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 18 US.C. §§ 2251, 2252, 2253).
Congress again revised pornography laws and enacted the Child Sexual Abuse and 
Pornography Act of 1986, which prohibited manufacture or use of advertisements for child 
pornography. Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 2, 100 Stat. 3510 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251). In addition, amendments to this statute imposed liability on pomographers for personal 
injuries suffered by children as a result of child pornography. Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat.
1783 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2255).
By 1988, Congress directed revisions of child pornography statutes towards concerns 
about the use of computer technology to produce and disseminate child pornography. The Child 
Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988 criminalized using a computer to "transport, 
distribute, or receive" child pornography. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 A, 2252). This Act imposed liability on anyone who took 
custody, bought, sold, or otherwise controlled children to produce pornography. Id.
This Court, in 1990, upheld the constitutionality of an Ohio statute that criminalized 
possession of child pornography, and held that the state interest in preventing harm to children 
was compelling enough to justify proscription of an individual’s right to possess small quantities 
of child pornography. Osborne v. OhiOy 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
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In 1990, Congress for the first time banned possession, rather than merely the production 
of child pornography, with the Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act.
Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 301,104 Stat. 4789 (1990) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(a)(4)). This statute imposed criminal sanctions on anyone who possessed three or more 
pieces of child pornography. In 1994, these pornography statutes were amended to address and 
sanction the production or importation of child pornography. Id.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA), which 
amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252,2256 to address virtual pornography. (J.A. 30-31.) Under 
the CPPA revisions, material no longer needed to depict an actual minor engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct to constitute child pornography. Rather, visual depictions of sexually explicit 
behavior involving computer-altered or computer-generated "virtual" minors now fulfill the
requirements of child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2256.
Congress shifted the focus of pornography legislation in 1996 with the enactment of the 
Child Pornography Prevention Act (“CPPA^. (J.A. 30.) Within this statute. Congress 
criminalized pornographic exploitation of not only real, identifiable children, but also 
pornographic exploitation of non-existent, computer-generated depictions of children. (J.A. 31- 
32.) Real harm to real children was no longer the issue; rather. Congress determined that 
pornographic expression which could possibly be construed as involving children should be
illegal. (J.A. 41-42.)
The CPPA defines child pornography as;
Any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, 
or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or 
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit 
conduct, where -
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
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(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to 
appear that such an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, 
described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the 
impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a 
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct....
18 U.S.C. §2256(8).
The CPPA bans visual depictions of adults who appear to be minors engaged in sexually 
explicit behavior. (J.A. 32.) Although an affirmative defense is available to pomographers if the 
actor depicted is, in fact, over 18, the statute requires
(1) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person or 
persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(2) each such person was an adult at the time the material was produced; 
and
(3) the defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or 
distribute the material in such a manner as to convey the impression 
that it is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C. §2252A(c).
The accused pomographers bear the burden of proof, as well as the expense of proving that the 
actors were not minors. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(2).
2. Effects of the CPPA on the Free Speech Coalition.
The Free Speech Coalition represents businesses and individuals involved in the 
production, distribution, sale and presentation ofnon-obscene adult-oriented material. (J.A. 3). 
The Free Speech Coalition and its member artists, photographers and publishers, do not advocate 
or tolerate the production or distribution of child pornography. In fact. The Free Speech 
Coalition offers an award of up to ten thousand dollars to any person who provides information 
leading to the arrest and conviction of persons involved in child pornography. (J.A. 3.) These
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individuals have a right to free speech under the First Amendment and the CPPA abridges that 
right. Several Free Speech Coalition members have altered their usual business practices in fear 
of prosecution under the CPPA.
World Wide Marketing removed nude and semi-nude persons who may appear to be 
minors from its web sites for fear of prosecution under the CPPA. (J.A. 23.) Outlaw 
Productions, Inc. has neither produced nor distributed certain sexually explicit films since 
passage of the CPPA, despite the fact that actors in these films are, and always have been, over 
the age of eighteen. (J.A. 18.) Outlaw Productions, Inc. does not produce and distribute films 
that the company would otherwise produce and market solely out of fear of prosecution under 
the CPPA. (J.A. 17-18.) Tansen, Inc., d.b.a. Naught-Too-Naughty, sells sexually explicit 
magazines and rents and sells sexually explicit videos. (J.A. 20.) All actors in all of these 
magazines and videos, are, and always have been over eighteen. (J.A. 21.) Naught-Too- 
Naughty designs and directs products to adult audiences, yet removed these products from store
shelves, fearing prosecution under the CPPA. (J.A. 21.)
Along with The Free Speech Coalition, other Respondents fear prosecution and prison 
sentences under the CPPA if they promote, sell, and/or simply possess works of art, which law 
enforcement officers may erroneously construe as pornography. (J.A. 3.) Respondents Bold 
Type, Inc. published "California Nude Beaches" to promote the ideals and philosophy of nudism. 
(J.A. 3.) Respondent Jim Gingerich is an artist whose work frequently reflects large-scale nudes, 
which are sold across the United States. (J.A. 3.) Respondent Ron Raffaelli is a professional 
photographer specializing in erotic photography, who currently designs an erotic art web site 
(J.A. 3.) These Respondents see no alternative but to self-censor their constitutionally protected 
expression. (J.A. 4.)
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3. Congressional Constitutional Concerns^
During legislative debates on the CPPA, a number of United States Senators, including
Senators Biden, Simon, Kennedy, and Feingold, expressed concerns that the overly broad
language of the CPPA raised issues of abridgement of First Amendment right to free speech.
(J.A. 51-61.) Indeed, Senators Feingold and Simon opposed passage of the CPPA for these
reasons. Senator Feingold believed the CPPA exceeded permissible bounds by extend[ing] the
definition of child pornography to drawings or images which ‘appear' to be minors or visual
depictions which 'convey' the impression of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,
whether an actual minor is involved or not." (J.A. 59-60.) Senator Feingold predicted that the
courts would overrule CPPA provisions and persuasively elaborated that
Congress has embarked upon an unconstitutional course in seeking 
to address activity, which is being conducted via modem 
technology.... There can be no doubt that the advent of emerging 
computer technology poses challenges to our society on many 
fronts. Some challenges are positive and some are not. However, 
we should not abandon the Constitution in seeking to resolve those 
challenges. (J.A. 61.)
Despite these misgivings, Congress approved the CPPA in 1996. (J.A. 31.)
Shortly thereafter. The Free Speech Coalition filed its lawsuit challenging the 
constitutionality of the CPPA because it violated the First Amendment. (J.A. 1.) The district 
court held that the CPPA was not an improper restrain on Free Speech. The Ninth Circuit 
reversed and held that the phrases “appear to be” and “conveys the impression” violated the First 
Amendment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) is a content-based regulation of free 
speech because the statute bans all non-obscene, sexually-explicit materials depicting minors.
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including images of youthful-looking adults and fictional images. As content-based regulation, 
the statute is presumptively unconstitutional. Use of the phrases “appears to be” and conveys the 
impression” to characterize and define illegal sexually explicit images infringes First 
Amendment rights. This Court held that Congress may prohibit materials that show live actual 
children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, but that all other materials retain First Amendment 
protection. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753. Here, none of the visual depictions that “appear[] to be” or 
“convey[] the impression” of a minor involve real live children. Thus, the CPPA bans visual 
depictions that this Court previously protected. Id.
The Ferber Court focused on protecting real children from sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation. The CPPA bans materials regardless of whether actual children appear in those 
materials. The argument that sexually explicit material produced without actual children harms 
real children thwarts the First Amendment. The CPPA allows the government to ban materials 
solely because of the effect those materials would have on the viewer. The CPPA would, in 
effect, ban any material for its potential negative effects.
To survive a constitutional challenge under strict scmtiny, the CPPA must address a 
compelling purpose and must implement the most narrowly tailored means to serve those 
interests. The government’s interests are insufficiently compelling to justify the CPPA’s broad 
ban on constitutionally protected material because virtual child pornography harms no actual 
children. No evidence that virtual child pornography harms actual children appears in the record 
and the government’s interest in regulating the potential behavior of pedophiles does not justify a 
ban on First Amendment protected materials for all adults.
Even if the government shows a compelling interest, the “appears to be” and “convey the
impression” phrases are not narrowly tailored to that interest. These provisions incorrectly and
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inadequately define child pornography and outlaw constitutionally protected expression that does 
not involve real children. Even if a link existed between virtual child pornography and the child 
pornography market, the CPPA is not narrowly tailored to regulate or solve that problem.
This Court has held that the government may not “reduce the adult population ... to 
reading[]and viewing only what is fit for children.” ACLUv. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997). 
The CPPA does just that. Indeed, the mere fact that some speech is offensive does not justify its 
suppression. Freedom of speech is freedom for the thoughts people hate.
The CPPA is unconstitutionally vague because it gives too little notice to the public and 
too much discretion to the police. The statute does not define prohibited behavior in terms that a 
person of ordinary intelligence understands. The phrases “appears to be a minor or conveys 
the impression” of a minor leaves to the public the problem of resolving to whom the person 
must appear to be a minor and “how a minor appears.” The government’s reliance on the words 
“virtually indistinguishable” to solve the vagueness problem fails as those words appear nowhere 
in the statute.
The CPPA leaves law enforcement officers and the public in the dark with potentially 
serious consequences. Without a precise definition, law enforcement officers have unlimited 
discretion and are free to determine policy. The result is arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.
The CPPA is overbroad because the “appears to be” and “conveys the impression 
provisions ban materials protected by the First Amendment. The argument that the statute bans 
only materials that are “virtually indistinguishable” from real children fails. The CPPA bans 
much more, specifically “any visual depiction,” or materials that this Court has never before held 
to be child pornography and that do not harm children.
10
The CPPA bans film, paintings, and works of serious artistic, scientific, educational, and 
literary merit. The statute vests in government the power to determine what speech merits First 
Amendment protection. If the government can ban virtual pornography because of the harm it 
causes, then the government can ban any expression that stimulates criminal or socially 
undesirable conduct.
The statute’s affirmative defense does not solve the overbreadth problem and undermines 
the laws of criminal procedure. Instead of a presumption that the defendant is not guilty, the 
CPPA forces the defendant to prove his innocence. The CPPA applies to all materials, even to 
those materials created before pornography statutes imposed a record-keeping requirement. The 
affirmative defense levies a heavy burden on producers and distributors because the statute 
requires that they prove that the sexually explicit images feature a young-looking adult, not a 
minor.
The affirmative defense is no help to artists and creators of computer-generated images 
because they cannot prove the age of an imaginary person. Consumers and distributors who own 
more than three sexually explicit images receive no protection from the affirmative defense and 
the CPPA protects owners of three or fewer images only if they destroy the images immediately. 
Thus, the nominal affirmative defense stands as a travesty to the criminal justice system.
For these reasons. Free Speech Coalition and its members seek a permanent injunction 
of certain provisions of the CPPA. This Court should affirm the decision of the Ninth Circuit. 
Free Speech Coalition^ 198 F.3d at 1086.
11
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I. THE CPPA BANS ALL IMAGES THAT “APPEAR TO .p™IMPRESSION” OF MINORS ENGAGED IN NON-OBSCENE SEXIMLLY EXPLICIT 
CONDUCT, AND THEREBY INFRINGES AN ENTIRE CATEGORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH.
The Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) outlaws any and all speech when that 
speech is expressed as computer-generated images of children involved in sexually explicit 
conduct. Congress ostensibly enacted the CPPA to protect children from sexual abuse at the 
hands of child pomographers. Congress hoped that the CPPA would extend existent prohibitions 
on the use of children in pornography beyond the realm of real children into the make-believe 
world of cyberpomography. Under the CPPA, creation, possession, production, or distribution
of any computer-generated depiction of sexually explicit conduct which conveys the 
impression” of involving a child who “appears to be a minor” now constitutes criminal behavior. 
No evidence in the record documents, or even suggests, that the CPPA protects or could protect 
any real children from any sexual exploitation or sexual abuse. In short. Congress expended a 
great deal of time, energy and expense to make the world safe for computer-generated images 
and to protect computer-generated images of children from the evils of sexual exploitation by 
pedophiles.
The First Amendment guarantees that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech.” Although freedom of speech is a fundamental right, this Court rejected and 
continues to reject an absolute right of freedom of speech. Rather, this Court has held routinely 
that Congress may legitimately restrict content-neutral speech. Statutes regulating content-based 
speech, however, are presumptively invalid and therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 
Because the CPPA proscribes only child pornography, the statute is content-based, and
presumptively invalid. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, unless the government satisfies the two-
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prong test of 1) a compelling state interest, 2) that the CPPA addresses with narrowly tailored 
means, this court must strike down the statute as unconstitutional.
Congressional intent notwithstanding, the First Amendment protects free speech unless 
the state demonstrates interests sufficiently compelling to overcome strict scrutiny of the CPPA. 
The stated aim of Congress to prevent sexual exploitation of children is not sufficiently 
compelling to justify Congressional disregard of the Constitution. The CPPA outlaws any and 
all speech when that speech contains a computer-generated image of a child who “appears to be a 
minor” involved in sexually explicit conduct—regardless of whether any actual child posed as a 
model for the computer-generated image. Contrary to previous pornography statutes that 
required prosecutors to identify actual children exploited in child pornography, the CPPA 
magnifies Congressional contempt for the right of free speech by eliminating requisite 
identification of the child who inspired the computer-generated image. Predictably, the lack of 
any requirements to identify exploited children in computer-generated pornography subjects 
innocent artists to fear of prosecution. This fear chills both artistic expression and the desire of 
artists to express themselves using computer technology as a medium.
Because computer artists do not exploit actual children during the creation of computer­
generated “virtual” child pornography, the government cannot rely on the stated aim of the 
CPPA to protect children from actual sexual exploitation as a purpose compelling enough to 
justify abridgement of Respondents’ right to free speech. The government cannot demonstrate 
either a compelling state interest or that the CPPA is the least restrictive means of implementing 
that purpose.
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A. The Content-Rased CPPA Ts Presumptively TTnconstitutional.
Restrictions directed against specific categories of speech qualify as content-based speech 
regulation regardless ofthe purpose of the restrictions. U.S. v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 
1999). The Hilton Court held that the CPPA was content-based speech regulation because the 
statute 1) focused on a particular category of speech (pornography), and 2) banned only that 
particular type of speech. Id. Absent a compelling purpose for the statute and implementation of 
the least restrictive means of achieving that purpose, courts presume content-based statutes are 
unconstitutional. Despite this presumption, courts regard some categories of speech, such as 
obscenity, as unprotected. Chaplinksy v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). The Court more 
recently expanded the range of unprotected categories of speech to include child pornography 
exploiting images of actual children. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. In Ferber, the Court held that a 
New York statute banning child pornography was constitutional because the compelling state 
interests of protecting children from physiological and emotional harm attendant to participation 
in child pornography clearly and significantly outweighed the minimal, if not de minimus, value 
of child pornography. Id. at 762.
B. Governmental Interests Are Insufficiently Compelling To Justify the Restrictions
of the Virtual Child Pornography Statute.
The CPPA restricts sexually explicit portrayals of young-looking adults or fictional 
computer-generated images of yoimg people who “appear to be” minors. By definition, then, the 
CPPA is a content-based restriction of speech. During legislative debates about the CPPA, 
members of Congress professed their aims 1) to protect children from physical and psychological 
abuse, 2) to eliminate trafficking in pornographic material, and 3) to reduce pedophile 
stimulation. Computer-generated pornography does not threaten actual children with, nor cause 
actual children to suffer physical abuse. Because computer programmers do not exploit actual
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children during the creation, manufacture and/or production of virtual pornography, the 
government's stated aims underlying the CPPA are not sufficiently compelling to abrogate free 
speech.
1. No real children suffer harm from depictions of sexually explicit condu^ 
involving voune adults or computer-generated images.
Congress may regulate non-obscene, sexually explicit material if, and only if, that 
material depicts real children. Such legislation survives constitutional challenge because the 
state has a compelling purpose to protect minors from physical or psychological exploitation. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758. The Ferber court emphasized the opinion that actual children must 
suffer harm, stating that “[a]s a state judge in this case observed, if it were necessary for literary 
or artistic value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked younger can be utilized... . 
Simulation outside of the prohibition of the statute could provide another alternative.” Id. at 763. 
The Ferber court, ruling on a New York statute regulating child pornography involving real 
children, suggested either substitution of child-like adults for minors or some type of simulation 
of child pornography (perhaps computer simulations?). Id. The Court decided Ferber long 
before Congress proposed the current anti-pornography statute. In essence, the Court suggested 
that such conduct would be constitutional, a decision which begs the question of why the CPPA 
bans this same conduct.
2. The CPPA regulates potential problems rather than identified problems.
The CPPA restricts freedom of expression for the ostensibly compelling purpose of 
preventing sexual abuse of children. The CPPA accomplishes this goal by reducing access of 
pedophiles to child pornography, thereby limiting the opportunities for pedophiles to satisfy their 
sexual appetites. Congress inadvisably relied on the misconception that all consumers of 
pornography evolve into child molesters, whereas, in reality, the link between the use of
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pornography and the perpetration of sexual crimes is correlational rather than causal. D. D. 
Burke. The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question, 34 Harv.
J. on Legis., 339, 464 (1997). Without a causal connection between the use of pornography and 
the commission of sexual crimes, the argument that the CPPA protects real children from sexual 
abuse falters. The weak link between use of pornography and commission of sexual abuse is too 
tenuous to sustain the strict scrutiny measure of a compelling state purposees p ecially in light of 
Respondents’ advocacy for free speech only with respect to virtual actors in computer-generated 
images of young adults engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
C. Provisions of the CPPA That Regulate Sexually Explicit Images of Actors Who
“Appear to Be” or “Convey the Impression” of a Minor Are More Restrictive 
Than Necessary.
Even if the government has a compelling state interest, the CPPA does not use the most 
narrowly tailored means to achieve that interest. Sable Commun. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115,126 (1989) (holding Congress may regulate protected speech to promote a compelling 
governmental interest if, and only if, Congress selects “the least restrictive means to further the 
articulated interest.”). The CPPA fails to implement the least restrictive means of protecting 
minors from physical and psychological harm. The statute instead restricts the First Amendment 
rights of consumers, and shifts to nonfeasors the burden of proving innocence, yet does not 
eliminate exploitation of minors in the production of child pornography.
The Fourth Circuit has approved as narrowly tailored a ban on child pornography, 
including possession. U.S. v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 920 (4th Cir. 2000). Child pornography 
involving real children, however, differs radically from sexually explicit depictions showing an 
individual who “appear[s] to be” or “conveys the impression” of being a minor. This Court has 
not yet approved a ban on virtual child pornography, although the Hilton court held that the
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CPPA satisfied the narrowly tailored standard because new technology allows child 
pomographers to avoid prosecution under conventionally drafted statutes. 167 F.3d at 73. This 
Court has held that the First Amendment needs breathing space, but that statutes may reflect a 
considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of expression must yield to otjier 
compelling needs of society. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937). Nonetheless, 
statutes that attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be 
narrowly drawn. The lack of a proven causal link between virtual child pornography and harm 
to real children belies any argument that Congress drafted the CPPA as the most narrowly 
tailored means to solve the problem of sexual exploitation of real children. Burke. 34 Harv. J. on
r
Legis. at 464.
I T.aw-abidinp tradespeople fear prosecution for legitimate busine^ 
activities under the CPPA.
The CPPA steals from Respondents their fundamental right to free speech, a right that is 
guaranteed to every person in the United States. Fear of prosecution under the CPPA motivated 
several members of the Free Speech Coalition to alter their business practices. World Wide 
Marketing removed nude and semi-nude persons who may appear to be minors from its web sites 
for fear of prosecution under the CPPA. (J.A. 23.) Outlaw Productions. Inc. has neither 
produced nor distributed certain pornographic films since Congress passed the CPPA, despite the 
fact that actors in these films are, and always have been, over the age of eighteen. (J.A. 18.) 
Outlaw Productions, Inc. has not produced or distributed films that the company would 
otherwise make and market-solely out of fears of prosecution under the CPPA. (J.A. 17-18.) 
Tansen, Inc., d.b.a. Naught-Too-Naughty, sells sexually explicit magazines and rents and sells 
sexually explicit videos. (J.A. 20.) All actors in all of these magazines and videos, are, and 
always have been over eighteen. (J.A. 21.) In addition. Tansen designs these products for, and
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directs them to adult audiences. (J.A. 21.) Nevertheless, because of fears of prosecution for 
marketing, or even for simple possession of these products, Naught-Too-Naughty removed these
products from store shelves. (J.A. 21.)
Along with The Free Speech Coalition, other Respondents fear prosecution and' 
incarceration under the CPPA for promotion, sale, and/or simple possession of works of art 
which law enforcement officers may erroneously construe as child pornography. (J.A. 3.) 
Respondent Bold Type, Inc. published "California Nude Beaches" to promote the ideals and 
philosophy of nudism. (J.A. 3.) Respondent Jim Gingerich is an artist whose work frequently 
reflects large-scale nudes sold across the United States. (J.A. 3.) Respondent Ron Raffaelli is a
r
professional photographer specializing in erotic photography, who currently designs an erotic art 
web site (J.A. 3.) These Respondents see no alternative but to self-censor their constitutionally 
protected expression. (J.A. 4.)
2. The CPPA proscribes legitimately protected rather than exempt speecfr 
With the CPPA, Congress reaches beyond the boundaries set by the Supreme Court in 
Ferber and attempts to regulate protected speech. In Ferher, the Court granted certiorari for a 
constitutional challenge to a New York statute that prohibited knowingly distributing 
promotional materials advertising a sexual performance by a child under the age of 16. 458 U.S. 
at 749. The Court held that the pornography statute was narrowly tailored to achieve the 
compelling state-asserted purpose of preventing physiological, emotional, and mental harm to 
children, and that the statute passed constitutional muster. Id. The Court focused on the harm 
caused to real children and held that the First Amendment does not protect some categories of 
child pornography. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. Ferber recognized that states deserve some leeway 
in regulating child pornography, and held that child pornography need not be obscene to be
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illegal. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761. Ferber did not, however, relax judicial scrutiny enough to 
allow a pornography statute to infringe free speech in an attempt to protect artificial children 
created in a cyberworld. On the contrary, the Court restricted its holding, stating that 
“distribution of descriptions or depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do 
not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances,
retains First Amendment protection.” Id. at 765.
The CPPA covers imaginary, computer-generated children and imaginary, computer­
generated sexual performances of imaginary children. Neither these prohibited computer­
generated children, nor their exploits, are real. The statute reaches beyond the permissible 
interpretation of this Court to prohibit the depiction of computer-generated children who appear 
to be minors and of computer-generated images that convey the impression of a minor-even 
when these images depict young-looking adults or even non-people. Under every previous 
ruling of this Court, speech about imaginary people or non-obscene real people retains First 
Amendment protection. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765; Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1972). The CPPA’s 
attempt to regulate protected speech renders the statute unconstitutional.
3 rr.n[>ress attemnts to control the thoughts of malfeasors and nonfeasors 
alike with the CPPA.
The CPPA unconstitutionally criminalizes private “evil” thoughts by regulating 
computer-generated pornography created without exploiting actual children. (“Private fantasies 
are not within the [federal child pornography] statute’s ambit.” U. S. v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 
1245 (9th Cir. 1987)). Although words that “incite imminent lawless activity (‘fighting 
words”) are not constitutionally protected speech, words that do not meet this standard are 
constitutionally protected even if those words promote illegal activity. Brandenburg v. Ohio,
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395 U.S. 444,449 (1969); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; Burke, 34 Harv. J. on Legis. at 461. 
Anonymous emailers frequently “spam” computer users with unwanted advertisements, political 
statements, and pictures. The CPPA imposes liability on any potential receiver of anonymous 
computer-generated pornography, regardless of whether the receiver wanted or requested 
computer-generated sexual depictions. The CPPA threatens these innocent consumers because 
any receiver who opens that email, and who fails to immediately delete the file or contact the 
police, satisfies the scienter requirement of the CPPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a)(2). Even those 
consumers who may want computer-generated products depicting sexual conduct of consenting 
adults are liable under the CPPA if the images “appear to be” minors. No legal theory justifies 
criminalizing the thoughts of nonfeasors who, by definition, commit no crime.
4. Previous statutes effectively regulate child pomoeraphv.
The CPPA exceeds means used by other pornography statutes in two ways. First, the 
CPPA is the first pornography legislation that attempts to control computer-generated or 
“morphed” pornographic images. Second, although other statutes criminalize production, 
distribution, and possession of virtual child pornography, the CPPA provides an affirmative 
defense only for producers, distributors, and retailers. The CPPA does not permit the average 
consumer in possession of virtual child pornography to mount an affirmative defense. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252. In other words, the average consumer with three or more pieces of virtual child 
pornography is guilty, but a retailer with greater than 100 pieces of virtual child pornography 
goes free a ridiculous result!
5. No evidence suggests that the CPPA better regulates child pornography 
than previous statutes.
No evidence establishes a causal connection between virtual child pornography and
sexual abuse of children. Free Speech Coalition^ 198F.3dat 1093; Burke, 34 Harv. J. on Legis.
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at 464. No evidence exists in the record that virtual child pornography harms real children, nor 
that any harm to children from virtual child pornography is greater than that caused by 
conventional child pornography (and which is already adequately regulated by earlier statutes). 
Despite these shortcomings in the record, Petitioners argue that preventing harm to real children 
is a compelling enough purpose to justify restraint of free speech.
6. The CPPA outlaws leeal sexually explicit conduct of real adults.
The CPPA criminalizes traffickers in images of sexually explicit conduct of real adults 
who “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of being minors. Congress, however, never 
intended for the CPPA to “apply to a depiction produced using adults engaging i[n] sexually 
explicit conduct, even where a depicted individual may appear to be a minor.” (J.A. 44.) The 
actual language of the statute, however, does impose liability on those who produce, distribute, 
or possess images of adults that “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct. Rather than strike references to young-looking, real adults from the 
statutory language. Congress attempted to mitigate the potential damage of the actual language. 
Congress decided to restructure the basic tenets of criminal law in this country and force 
defendants to prove their innocence (i.e., prove that the images depicted real adults) rather than 
maintain the status quo and insist that prosecutors prove the guilt of defendants (i.e., prove that 
the images depict real minors). With the usual affirmative defenses, a defendant concedes 
having committed the underlying act, and concedes that the underlying acts are generally illegal, 
but argues that extenuating circumstances excuse the crime. Under the CPPA affirmative 
defense, however, defendants must mount the “affirmative defense” to show they committed no 
crime. In short, the “affirmative defense” under the CPPA is absurd, and does nothing but 
inexcusably ease the prosecutor’s burden of proof
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A.
II. THE LANGUAGE OF THE VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY STATUTE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE BECAUSE IT FAILS TO GIVE ADEQUATE
NOTICE TO THE PUBLIC AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS.
The CCPA does not define prohibited conduct precisely enough to give sufficient notice 
to a person of reasonable intelligence. Neither a person of reasonable intelligence nor a law 
enforcement officer has notice of what the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the impression 
of being a minor mean. This lack of notice becomes a real problem when an overzealous law 
enforcement officer has to determine what conveys the impression of being a minor. What 
appears to be a minor also varies as young-looking actresses can appear to be “sweet sixteen” 
while a thirteen year old raised on a Western diet can appear much older.
The CPPA throws a wide net that brings in materials protected by the First Amendment. 
As a result, the Free Speech Coalition members and the public will steer far wide of the unlawful 
zone for fear of entrapment by zealous law enforcement officials armed with vague provisions 
that allow for fifteen years in prison. Laws that do not clearly define prohibited conduct are void 
for vagueness. Groyned v. City ofRochford, 408 U.S. 104,108 (1972). The CPPA is void for 
vagueness because it does not clearly define prohibited acts.
A. The Virtual Child Pornography Statute Vaeuelv and Subiectivelv Defines Virtual 
Child Pornography and Prohibited Conduct.
The CPPA forbids production, sale, or possession of images of sexually explicit conduct 
in which the actor “appears to be” or “conveys the impression” that he is a minor. The problem 
is that someone may not know whether the actress they are watching is, in fact, a minor or just 
“appears to be” or “conveys the impression” of being one. The CPPA makes films like Blue 
Lagoon and American Pie potentially illegal because the statute fails to explicitly define the 
subjective standard.
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Even though the First Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the CPPA, the Court 
equivocated about the potential overreach of the statute. Specifically, the Court found 
troublesome the idea of violating the First Amendment merely to prohibit materials that contain 
an actor who “appears to be a minor.” Hilton, 167 F.3d at 71. The court voiced concerns that, 
on its face, the statute might proscribe depictions with political, artistic, scientific or educational 
values. Id.
Congress probably did not intend to prohibit works of great artistic merit, yet one 
interpretation of the CPPA is that possession of Michelangelo’s David, Raphael s angels, or 
Bergman’s masterpiece film Fanny and Alexander is illegal. As community standards differ, the 
enforcement of the CPPA will vary and the public will be left in the dark. After all, what would 
be obscene in the Bible Belt would hardly raise an eyebrow in San Francisco, yet the CPPA 
leaves that definition open to interpretation. In short, no one can know whether the CPPA
outlaws a statue of David or a painting by Raphael.
The Hilton court theorized that the phrase “appears to be a minor” would ban possession 
of adult pornography created with young-looking models. Id. Although the Ferber Court held 
that the Constitution protects possession of adult pornography, the CPPA mandates up to fifteen 
years in prison for engaging in this constitutionally sanctioned conduct. The very vagueness of 
the statute chills freedom of expression.
B. Unconstitutionally Defined Provide Inadequate Warning To the Pubha
The linchpin of the vagueness doctrine is whether the public can know or must merely 
guess the meaning of statutes. The CPPA fails to provide sufficient notice. Neither The Free 
Speech Coalition, nor the public at large, know what conduct the CPPA prohibits. This Court 
held that any criminal statute that did not notify a suspect how to satisfy the requirement
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“credible and reliable” identification was unconstitutionally vague. Kolender v. Lawson^ 461 
U.S. 352, 358 (1983). In Kolender, the plaintiff challenged his conviction under a California 
statute that required persons who loiter or wander the streets to provide “credible and reliable” 
identification. Id. at 353. The CPPA, like the statute in Kolender, does not inform the public 
whose opinion determines what “appear to be” or “conveys the impression” of being a minor. 
This omission makes the statute unconstitutionally vague.
Laws must give the ordinary citizen fair notice of how to conform his conduct to the law. 
City of Chi. v Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57 (1999). \n Morales, this Court held that a city ordinance 
that prohibited loitering, but did not adequately set the boundary between permissible and 
impermissible conduct, was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 58. The CPPA fails for the same 
reasons. The statute’s failure to define what “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” of a 
minor does not adequately set the boundary between permitted sexually explicit images of 
young-looking adults and prohibited sexually explicit images of minors.
This Court held that the stakes are higher with criminal statutes, and that no one should 
have to speculate about the meaning of criminal statutes. The very vagueness of the CPPA 
forces the public to do exactly that. The Free Speech Coalition stopped production and 
distribution of constitutionally protected magazines, films and works of art, rather than wagering 
unsuccessfully about the statute’s meaning. See generally v. N.J., 306 U.S. 451,453
(1939) (holding that a New Jersey statute that vaguely defined a gangster as an unemployed gang 
member with at least three disorderly and one criminal conviction violated due process).
C. Unconstitutionally Defined Statutes Allow Arbitrary and Discriminatory
Enforcement.
Lack of appropriate notice of what constitutes prohibited conduct poses an even greater 
problem for law enforcement officers. The subjective definitions of the CPPA accord various
24
officers of the law (including police officers, prosecutors, and judges) an alarming degree of 
discretion, with potentially nightmarish implications.
This Court has held that a statute must establish minimum standards to govern law 
enforcement and guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests. Kolender, 461 U.S. 
at 358. The CPPA does not establish minimum standards, and the lack of clear definitions for 
the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” of a minor gives law enforcement 
officers unfettered, arbitrary, and unchecked discretion. A zealous prosecutor can use the statute 
to prosecute innocent members of the public, and determine at will, with unfortunate 
consequences, whether the sexually explicit images are of a young adult or a minor. This 
unquestioning deference to law enforcement officers empowers them to determine policy, a job 
more properly the province of Congress.
The CPPA lacks the explicit standards all good laws have. The vagueness of the statute’s 
key phrases is particularly problematic in the context of virtual images. Under the CPPA, police 
can arrest anyone who possesses computer-generated sexually explicit images of imaginary 
young adults because the law enforcement officer capriciously determines that the images are of 
children. Since these images are not real children, the alleged miscreant cannot prove that he 
used no real children to create the images.
The fact that the CPPA is a criminal statute compounds the vagueness problem. The 
severity of criminal sanctions may cause innocent adults to remain silent rather than engage in 
constitutionally protected activity. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 872. In ACLU. this Court considered a 
criminal statute that imposed up to two years in prison for each violation, and held that this 
increased deterrent effect, coupled with the “risk of discriminatory enforcement” of vague laws, 
posed greater First Amendment concerns than a civil statute. Id. The CPPA imposes a more
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severe penalty (up to fifteen years in prison) and, for that reason, poses even greater First 
Amendment concerns than the statute in ACLU. The statute’s vagueness is the very kind of evil 
against which this Court cautioned in ACLU, a real concern as indicated by the fact that The Free 
Speech Coalition members choose to remain silent rather than engage in constitutionally 
protected activity. 521 U.S. at 872.
D. Imprecisely Defined States Like the CPPA Are Fatally Unconstitutional
The CPPA is unconstitutionally vague and the government’s attempt to bring precision to 
the statute through the use of the phrase “virtually indistinguishable from an image of an actual 
minor” does not remedy the flaws. Indeed, the government only succeeds in defining statutory 
provisions of the CPPA by going outside the statute because Congress buried the words 
“virtually indistinguishable” within the legislative records. Sen. Rep. 104-358, at pt. I, IV(B). If 
the government needs to go beyond the statute to define its provisions, that statute, by definition, 
cannot provide notice to the unsuspecting public. The Free Speech Coalition’s law-abiding 
producers, distributors and artist members cannot grasp the statute’s meaning and forego their 
constitutionally protected rights rather than risk criminal penalties.
Even with an objective standard, the statute is impermissibly vague. Unlike the statute in 
Osborne, the CPPA does not spell out clearly legal or illegal conduct. 495 U.S. at 106. The 
terms “appear to be” and “conveys the impression” could mean one thing to the “unsuspecting 
viewer” and quite another to the “reasonable person.” The statute does not clarify to whom the 
person must appear as a minor and what characteristics define a minor. Playboy features 
photographs of freshmen college students who appear titillatingly young and innocent but are 
over the age of eighteen. The most recent film version of Lolita featured an actress whom an 
unsuspecting viewer might believe “appear[s] to be” a minor though the “reasonable person”
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might assume that the actress was a young-looking adult. The CPPA forbids one or both of these
images. Because of this uncertainty, Free Speech Coalition member Jim Gingerich avoids
painting large-scale yet fictitious nudes and Ron Rafaelli does not photograph any young looking
adults for fear of prosecution under the CPPA. To have to make such a choice is unacceptable
• • i
and chills free speech.
III. THE STATUTE’S “APPEARS TO BE “ AND “CONVEYS THE IMPRESSION” OF A 
MINOR PROVISIONS ARE OVERBROAD BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT LIMITED 
TO MATERIALS THAT HARM CHILDREN.
The CPPA prohibits more speech than is necessary. The statute’s “appears to be” and
“conveys the impression” provisions proscribe constitutionally protected materials that include
youthfiil-looking adults and fictional images that do not involve real children. Even if the statute
only bans computer-generated images that are “virtually indistinguishable” from real children,
that limitation appears nowhere in the statute. The Free Speech Coalition and its members have
curtailed artistic expression and foregone business opportunities that are protected by the First
Amendment proof that the statute is indeed overbroad.
A. The. Statute Bans Not Onlv “Virtually Indistinguishable Images ” but Also_“AnY 
Visual Depiction.”
The argument that the CPPA only bans material with images “virtually indistinguishable” 
from real children is misleading. The statute bans “any visual depiction” that “appears to be” or 
“conveys the impression” of a minor. That ban includes sexually explicit images of youthful- 
looking adults, material to which Ferber granted First Amendment protection. 458 U.S, at 763.
Several circuits have looked at the statute and struggled with its definition. The First 
Circuit in Hilton discussed various possible interpretations of the language of the CPPA. 167
F.3d at 72. The court only determined from the legislative record that the CPPA targeted a 
narrow class of images. Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that the statute did not explicitly state that
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the “appears to be” language banned only “virtually indistinguishable” images. Mento, 231 F.3d 
at 921. The Court held “that the CPPA criminalized certain images that resemble true 
photographs but are in fact altered from innocent and unrelated sources....” Id. This 
interpretation means the CPPA, as written, criminalizes the paintings of Respondent jljm 
Gingerich. Although his work reflects only his imagination, and not real children, the CPPA 
nevertheless bans his creativity.
B. The CPPA Bans Speech Constitutionally Protected und_er Ferber.
The express language of the CPPA bans materials with First Amendment protection.
Only section 2856(8)(A) bans true child pornography. Section 2856(B) defines child-
r
pornography as visual depictions that appear to be of a minor, section 2856(C) bans computer- 
generated or “morphed” images that convey the impression of a minor and 2856(D) bans images 
that do not include a minor but that distributors or retailers promote to convey the impression 
that a minor is involved.
The government argues that the “virtually indistinguishable” language saves the CPPA. 
That language, however, appears only in the legislative records and not in the statute itself. Sen. 
Rep. 104-358, at pt. I, IV, (B). This Court held that a statement of congressional findings is a 
rather thin reed upon which to base a requirement that the statute neither expressed nor implied. 
Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 260 (1994). In Sheidler, several pro-choice 
organizations sued anti-abortion activists under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO). Id. at 252. The anti-abortion activists argued that the lawsuit could 
not proceed, because the word “enterprise” in the statute required an economic motive. Id. at 
261. This Court disagreed, and held that the statutory language was unambiguous, noting that 
Congress could have, but chose not to narrow the sweep of the world. Id. at 260-61. The
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statutory language of the CPPA is unambiguous, and speaks only of visual depictions, not 
virtually indistinguishable images.
When the statute’s “any visual depiction” directly contradicts the “virtually 
indistinguishable language ” the statutory language controls. The CPPA bans any visual 
depiction in films, photography, pictures, illustrations and drawings. This ban includes serious 
literary, artistic, scientific materials that are neither obscene nor harmful to children and leaves 
the door wide open to chill protected speech. Under the CPPA, the Free Speech Coalition 
members can no longer paint, take photographs or publish books. Children can no longer own 
postcards of Raphael’s angels or books that explain puberty. This Court in Ferbet held that non 
obscene sexual expression that does not involve children is protected expression, yet the CPPA
bans exactly what Ferber protected. 458 U.S. at 763
C. The CPPA Grants Only Socially Heserving Imapes First Amendment Protection.,
The CPPA gives the government the right to determine which speech deserves First 
Amendment protection. The Mento court acknowledged that the CPPA prohibits fictional 
images protected by the First Amendment, but rationalized this overreach because the images 
had “little if any social value.” 231 F.3d at 921. Thus, more realistic imaginary creations 
receive less protection under the First Amendment. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1096. 
This idea is alarming. Speech requires protection, even if, and especially if, the subject is
distasteful.
To ban computer-generated, sexually explicit images that “appear to be or convey the 
impression” of real children because of potential harm is a frightening first step to thoug 
control. The logical next step is to allow the government to ban any expression that appears to 
be “ or “conveys the impression” of criminal or offensive conduct. Following this reasoni g.
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government may ban the recent film Bandits on the theory that it encourages bank robberies, or 
the summer hit Moulin Rouge because it encourages prostitution. What next? Will the 
government ban sex and violence on television because children may accidentally watch? This 
Court held that the First Amendment does not allow the government to censor expression 
because of the content of the message or ideas. Police Dept, v Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
The CPPA restricts the Respondents’ expression because Congress does not believe their 
message deserves First Amendment protection. With this attempt. Congress oversteps its 
authority.
D. The Affirmative Defense Does Not Solve the Overbreadth Problem.
The government points to the CPPA’s affirmative defense as a cure for the 
overbreadth problem. As a cure, the affirmative defense fails. The affirmative defense 
only applies to producers and distributors of sexually explicit images if they can prove 
that they produced the images with adult actors and did not promote the images to convey 
the impression that the actors were minors. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (c). In contrast with most 
criminal prosecutions in which the accused is innocent until proven guilty, the CPPA 
requires the accused to prove his iimocence.
The defense is less than useful for companies such as Outlaw Productions, Inc.,
(which produces and distributes sexually explicit videos and magazines) because the 
statute requires alleged producers of “child pornography” to show that each actor was an 
adult during production. To avail themselves of this defense, producers must be present 
at every photo shoot or film to review the identification of the actors and actresses and to 
ensure that they are not minors. This requirement imposes an undue burden on Outlaw 
Productions and others similarly situated who now chose not to distribute certain sexually
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The CPPA applies to all materials with images that “appear to be” or “convey[] the 
impression” of being a minor engaged in sexual conduct, even if the matenal predates statutes 
requiring record keeping. This unreasonable demand further reduces the value of the affirmative 
defense, as producers must spend time and energy to track down actors who looked young during 
movie production, but were most likely over the age of majority. The Fifth Circuit noted tha 
proof requirement was problematic, because defendants ‘ Vere virtually certain not to be able to 
track down . . . actors to adduce evidence of age.” U.S. v. Fox, 247 F.3d 394, 405 (5th Cir.
2001).
The affirmative defense is useless for producers of computer-generated images that do 
not depict real persons, because they will be unable to prove that the imaginary pers 
over the age of majority. For artists like Jim Gingrich, who paints large-scale fictiti 
the defense also offers scant comfort because his paintings are only figments of hi g
This defense does not protect consumers and distributors who did not produce t 
sexually explicit materials, and therefore, cannot prove if the person depicted is a mino 
a real person. Instead, consumers and distributors can only escape liability if they show 
they 1) posses fewer than three images, and 2) make prompt, good faith efforts to d y 
report the images to law enforcement 18 U.S.C. § 2256. This defense does not help artists like
Jim Gingrich who undoubtedly has multiple paintings in his studio at any one time 
which publishes books on nudism with pictures of youthful-looking adults. Any dis 
consumer who possesses more than three images has no defense at all under th
explicit films with young looking actors, for fear of prosecution under the CPPA. (J.A.
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The defense also does not protect the rest of the population that owns and collects 
movies. Collectors of serious films like Lolita, Pretty Baby, or Taxi Driver (which all starred 
underage actresses in sexually provocative roles) can choose to destroy the movies^ surrender 
them, or risk prosecution under the CPPA. Ironically, the affirmative defense only protects those 
who destroy or forfeit the films. Film lovers that choose to keep the Oscar winner Taxi Driver 
would risk prosecution. A forced choice between prosecution or loss of one s art works is no 
choice.
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that individuals could be prosecuted for sexually explicit 
depictions of young looking adults, but believed the danger was overstated. Fox, 247 F.3d at 
405. The court held that the existence of a few potential impermissible applications did not 
invalidate the statute. Id. For the unfortunate innocent parties that have to bear the financial, 
emotional and social costs of proving that they are not, in fact, pedophiles, the mere possibility 
of this danger is proof that the CPPA is overbroad.
E. The Vagueness of the CPPA Magnifies the Qverbrcadth Problem.
With the CPPA, Congress enacted a statute that exceeds necessary restraints. In its ardor 
to protect children, Congress ignored constitutionally protected rights and declared legal 
possession of non-obscene pornography illegal. This Court considered the problem of statutes 
that were both vague and overbroad in ACLU, 521 U.S. at 874. ACLU involved the 
Communications Decency Act, which criminalized transmissions of obscene or indecent 
messages to a minor on the Internet. Id. at 849. This Court noted that the risk that a vaguely 
worded statute would chill constitutionally protected speech was another reason to insist that a 
statute not be overly broad. Id. at 874.
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CONCLUSION
The CPPA is an unconstitutional content-based regulation. The government interest is 
insufficiently compelling to survive strict scmtiny. The use of the phrases “appears to be’ and 
“conveys the impression” are vague and overbroad and do not meet the requirements of the First 
Amendment. For the above reasons, this Court should AFFIRM the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit and hold that the CPPA is an unconstitutional infringement of free speech. In addition. 
Respondents seek to permanently enjoin Petitioners from enforcing the CPPA.
Respectfully submitted.
The CPPA’s vagueness makes its overbreadth a greater problem. The statute as written
cannot avoid constitutional problems. Although the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine, this
Court should apply it here. To hold otherwise would subject the public to the chilling effect such
a statute has on protected speech. Natl Movement v. City of Gumming, 934 F.2d 482, 485 (11th
Cir. 1991).
Counsel for Respondents
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